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ABSTRACT

With the rise in mobile payment applications, charitable donations using these platforms are
increasing; equally, the use of a conduit between a donor and a charity to solicit and collect
donations for the charity’s benefit is growing. If a charity is overfunded or the charitable purpose
is no longer available, the conduit is caught holding a pool of designated donations without the
ability to contact the donors for permission for a similar or alternate use. Using the Internal
Revenue Code requirements, the authority and regulations are not apparent for a charitable
contribution through a conduit, particularly not for a conduit’s use of a mobile payment
application.
Part I of this Article provides an overview of the conduit situation and the complications that
arise. Part II introduces the requirements of a charitable contribution and the services that
mobile payment applications offer. Part III analyzes three donation methods: a contribution
directly to a 501(c)(3) organization, a contribution to an individual, and a contribution to a 501(c)
(3) organization through an individual. Part IV examines the potential solutions to the issue of
overfunded charities and the motivations behind each. Finally, Part V offers a brief overview of
the prevalence of the issue and the future of mobile payment applications. The interaction of the

detailed requirements of the Internal Revenue Code for a charitable contribution and mobile
payment applications’ privacy policies, without clear authority or direction on the specific
conduit situation, has the potential to be problematic and challenging for the contributor,
conduit, charitable organizations, and mobile payment applications.
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I. INTRODUCTION
John posted on his Facebook status, “I’m raising money for The Boys & Girls Club of North
Mississippi. They need funds to build a new gymnasium. If you want to help, I will be collecting
donations via Venmo (@John_Doe).” John received many donations from his Facebook post
from people like Jane, who saw John’s Facebook post and paid John via Venmo with the
subject line, “For The Boys & Girls Club of North Mississippi gym.” Later, John went to deliver
the funds he collected to The Boys & Girls Club, and they told John that they had met their
funding needs for the gymnasium and did not need any more. With donations like Jane’s
donated specifically for The Boys & Girls Club of North Mississippi’s gymnasium, what does
John do with the leftover funds?
Similarly, Jane is the treasurer for an organization on campus. In her duty as treasurer, she
must collect all of the donations that the organization receives during their big fundraising
week through her Venmo account. Last year, the organization raised $30,000 for a children’s
shelter, meaning Jane had $30,000 in her Venmo account. The organization presented the
money to the children’s shelter at the start of the new year. If Jane had $30,000 sitting in her
Venmo account, does she have to report it as income on last year’s tax return? Likewise, would
a person who donated to the organization during the fundraising week last year get a tax
deduction on last year’s tax return or not until the new year?
Generally, when an individual, the contributor, transfers money to another individual using a
mobile payment application, the second individual, who transfers money to the charity,
becomes a conduit on behalf of the contributor. The donation will be deductible to the
contributor when the conduit transfers the funds to the charity.1
What happens when this well-intentioned conduit collects funds for a charitable purpose that
is overfunded before the money is transferred to the charity? When a charity has collected
sufficient funds for the charitable purpose, the charity returns those funds to the contributor.
In the conduit situation, however, the question is what should the conduit do with those funds.
This Article will address the problematic interaction between the Tax Code requirements and
the difficulty in returning the funds received in the conduit situation.

II. BACKGROUND
If a taxpayer donates to a charity, they are entitled to a deduction for their donation for income
tax purposes if the Internal Revenue Code (“I.R.C.”) requirements are satisfied.2 The Internal
Revenue Service implements the rules and regulations under the I.R.C. for charitable
contribution deductions. Title 26 of the U.S. Code is the I.R.C., codifying the federal tax laws.3 In
the I.R.C., different sections provide statutory law for different parts of taxation. For instance,
Section 170 covers charitable contributions and the requirements that must be satisfied to get
a deduction.4 To satisfy the requirements under Section 170, the contribution must be: made
to a charitable organization listed in Section 501; paid in the current taxable year; and less than
$250, unless the charity acknowledges the contribution.5 Even if the requirements under
Section 170 are satisfied, the amount a taxpayer is entitled to deduct is limited based on the
taxpayer’s taxable income, the type of contribution, and the recipient of the contribution.6
Similarly, Section 501 enumerates the organizations that will be considered exempt from
taxation and the conditions that must be fulfilled.7 In summary, each contribution that a
taxpayer is seeking a deduction for must satisfy the requirements of Section 170, and the
amount of the deduction must be determined by the preceding factors and limitations.8
A nonprofit organization and a tax-exempt qualifying organization differ in the rules that
regulate them. A nonprofit is an organization without a financial benefit and incorporated
under state law.9 A tax-exempt organization follows the I.R.C. federal laws.10 Organizations
included in Section 501(c)(3) are charitable organizations and exempt from taxation.11
Before determining a taxpayer’s entitlement to a deduction under Section 170, taxpayers must
first donate to a charitable organization.12 There are various means to make donations to
charities. In the past few years, online payment services have become a new way to donate
through electronic fund transfers. Because of the secure and simple, user-friendly online
payment platforms, they have become increasingly popular.13

A. REQUIREMENTS TO BE A CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTION
When a person donates money or property to a charitable organization, the donor can deduct
the contributions for income tax purposes.14 Charitable contributions are defined as “a

contribution or gift to or for the use of” a qualifying organization.15 For an organization to be a
qualifying organization under Section 170 (c), it must be:



A corporation, trust, or community chest, fund, or
foundation— . . . created or organized in the United States or
in any possession thereof, or under the law of the United
States, any State, the District of Columbia, or any possession
of the United States; . . . organized and operated exclusively
for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational
purposes, or to foster national or international amateur
sports competition (but only if no part of its activities involve
the provision of athletic facilities or equipment), or for the
prevention of cruelty to children or animals; . . . no part of
the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private
shareholder or individual; and . . . which is not disqualified
for tax exemption under section 501(c)(3) by reason of
attempting to influence legislation, and which does not
participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or
distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf
of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office.
A contribution or gift by a corporation to a trust, chest, fund,
or foundation shall be deductible by reason of this
paragraph only if it is to be used within the United States or
any of its possessions exclusively for purposes specified in

subparagraph (B). Rules similar to the rules of section 501(j)
shall apply for purposes of this paragraph.16

Within I.R.C. Section 170, a contribution or gift is a voluntary payment that is “made with no
expectation of procuring a financial benefit” corresponding to the intention for the donation or
amount of the contribution.17 Donations for the benefit of a designated individual are not
deductible as charitable contributions under Section 170.18
A donation is not a gift if the payment is made out of an obligation, future benefit, or exchange
of services.19 In Comm’r v. Duberstein, the taxpayer received the gift of a car in return for the
information the taxpayer revealed.20 The Court looked at the donative intent and held that a
gift must be made out of a “detached and disinterested generosity.”21 In determining whether a
transfer is a charitable contribution, the Court examines the donor’s “dominant motive” when
applying Duberstein’s detached and disinterested generosity standard.22 In Allen v. U.S., the
taxpayer’s dominant motive in a transaction of acres of redwoods deeded to the city was
preserving the redwoods.23 Therefore, the purpose and intent of a donation must be for a
public benefit and to a qualifying organization for a donation to be a charitable contribution.24

B. ELECTRONIC FUND TRANSFERS
A charitable contribution is made in cash, check, or a monetary gift, including transfers of gift
cards redeemable for cash and payments by credit cards, electronic fund transfer, online
payment service, or payroll deductions.25 An electronic fund transfer is simply a transfer of
money from one bank account to another bank account.26 An online payment service is a
platform that has the technology to enable payment transactions electronically.27

C. ONLINE PAYMENT SERVICES
Mobile payment applications are online services that act as an alternative method of
payment.28 Examples of mobile payment applications that use electronic fund transfers are
Venmo, Cashapp, and PayPal.29 These applications are online payment services that act as a
digital wallet. You will connect your credit or debit card or your bank account to the

application, and it will allow you to pay and receive money directly through the platform.
These applications allow users to download, register, and make a transfer within minutes. An
individual can transfer funds from their bank account or credit card to another user on the
application. The second user can set up their bank account and transfer the funds to their bank
account. The users can pay, accept, and exchange money for goods and services.30 With the
flexibility of online payment services, millions of people are joining the platforms, and even
more money is being transferred.31 Online fundraising through payment services has become
popular among charities and donors.32 Particularly, the practice of crowdfunding to collect
small payments from many individuals to raise money through the use of social media and
mobile payment applications has grown quickly.33 The interaction of the requirements for
charitable deductions and the privacy aspects of online payment services creates a complex
web of rules for someone who acts as a conduit to collect and pay over funds to a charitable
organization.

III. PROBLEM: OVERFUNDED CHARITIES
In the John Doe fact pattern above, if The Boys & Girls Club of North Mississippi’s new gym
project’s needs have been fulfilled, or The Boys & Girls Club chose not to proceed with the
project, what does John do with the donations?34 Similarly, in the Jane example, what will she
do with the $30,000 in donations collected from last year’s fundraising week?35 The answers
differ in the following situations: a contribution to a charitable organization, a contribution
directly to an individual, or a contribution to a charitable organization through a conduit.

A. CONTRIBUTION TO A 501(C)(3) ORGANIZATION
An organization is tax-exempt if it is included within Section 501(c)(3).36 For an entity to be
recognized as a 501(c)(3) organization, it must apply to the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) by
submitting Form 1023 for approval by the IRS.37 Contributions to 501(c)(3) organizations are
tax-deductible; moreover, the organization is exempt from taxation.38 A 501(c)(3) organization,
i.e., qualified charitable recipient, is “any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and
operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes…”39
For example, if an individual contributes to the American Red Cross, the individual would be

allowed a deduction because the Red Cross has 501(c)(3) status and is tax-exempt. The term
“charitable” used in Section 501(c)(3) refers to the common law interpretation of the term and
includes:
Relief of the poor and distressed or of the underprivileged; advancement of religion;
advancement of education or science; erection or maintenance of public buildings,
monuments, or works; lessening of the burdens of Government; and promotion of social
welfare by organizations designed to accomplish any of the above purposes, or (i) to
lessen neighborhood tensions; (ii) to eliminate prejudice and discrimination; (iii) to defend
human and civil rights secured by law; or (iv) to combat community deterioration and juvenile
delinquency.40
Consequently, a donation to the American Red Cross is charitable because it provides
emergency assistance and relief to people affected by disasters.
To be a 501(c)(3) organization, the organization must satisfy the organizational and operational
tests in the I.R.C.41 An organizations’ articles stating that it was formed for charitable purposes
is sufficient to meet the organizational test.42 To meet the operational test, an organization will
be operated exclusively for an exempt purpose, only if it is primarily involved in activities that
accomplish an exempt purpose.43 Alternatively, an organization will not be operated
exclusively if “more than an insubstantial part” of its activities are not for an exempt purpose.44
Further, the organizational and operational tests are not satisfied unless the organization
serves a public interest.45

B. TARGETED CONTRIBUTIONS
Often when people donate money to a charity, they want to control their funds and designate
them for a particular purpose. They can accomplish this by selecting a charity with that
purpose. Sometimes donors can designate their funds to specific areas within that charity.
Once the donation is transferred to the charity, however, the charity, not the donor, must have
control over the funds.46 The charity must have sufficient control to satisfy the “to or for the
use of” a qualified organization standard.47 If the donation is made to a specific individual, the
charity does not have control over the donated funds to satisfy the “to or for the use of” a
qualified organization standard.48 In this situation, the contribution is not deductible.49

I. LIMITATIONS ON DONOR CONTROL
When a person donates money to a charity, the donor can earmark the donation to be used for
a particular charitable purpose. How specific can donor designations be? The donor has
control over where their donations go by donating them to a specific charity that aligns with
the donor’s intent. For example, you can donate to the University of Mississippi School of
Accounting, designating it to the school to be used however they wish, or you can donate to
the University of Mississippi Athletics and specifically designate it to be used in building a new
football stadium. Within the specific charities, you can designate use or to a group of
beneficiaries. For example, an individual can donate funds to the American Red Cross and
specify, “I want to support” victims of the western wildfires.50 Therefore, those donations are
earmarked and will aid in relief for the victims of the western wildfires.
In Peace v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the taxpayer made contributions to a religious
organization but named specific individuals.51 There were three types of donations to the
religious organization: general undesignated funds, funds for support, and special funds.52
General undesignated funds were for current expenses of the organization, and special funds
were “gifts designated for special projects and personal transmission gifts sent directly to the
missionaries concerned.”53 The court held that the taxpayer’s intention was not for the
donations to go directly to the individuals but rather placed in a common pool subject to the
organization’s control.54 Under their policy, the organization had exclusive control of the
donated funds and, therefore, were deductible.55
Further, the charity must maintain control over the donor’s funds to qualify for a deduction.56
In Brinley v. Comm’r, the court held that the church does not have to maintain full control over
the funds; rather, the control test was satisfied by non-possessory control of the church
maintaining discretion as to the use of the funds.57 The Brinley court argued that when a
charity solicits funds for a specific charitable purpose, possessory control is not required.58
However, the Supreme Court disagreed. In Davis v. U.S., the Court adopted a possessory
control test that requires a charity to have control over the funds to qualify for a deduction.59
Davis overruled courts that adopted a non-possessory control test and held that the transfer of
funds to the taxpayers’ sons was not “to or for the use of” the Church and did not satisfy the
control test.60 The Court looked to Congress’s intent to interpret the “to or for the use of”
phrase when enacting Section 170:



Congress sought to provide tax benefits to charitable
organizations, to encourage the development of private
institutions that serve a useful public purpose or
supplement or take the place of public institutions of the
same kind.61

Congress amended Section 170 to overcome the interpretation that disallowed a deduction for
contributions to a charity made in trust for that organization.



Moreover, a contribution made in trust for a charity does not
give the charity immediate possession and control, as does a
donation directly to a charity. Unlike a contribution that
must go “to” a qualified organization, a contribution “for the
use of” a donee may go to a trustee with the discretion to
select among a number of qualified donees to whom the
funds may be disbursed.62

If the donor does not receive a quid pro quo, an advantage or benefit in exchange for their
contributions, the transaction satisfies the charitable contribution or gift requirement.63 In
Davis, the ninth circuit held that the parent taxpayers did receive a quid pro quo in the
assurance that their missionary sons would be taken care of and that the sons received an
economic benefit because the payments were used for their proper care.64 This meant that the
Church was not the primary beneficiary from the transfer and did not satisfy the “to or for the
use of” requirement.65

There is no deduction under Section 170 for the contribution of services, but Treasury
Regulation Section 1.170A-1(g) provides, “unreimbursed expenditures made incident to the
rendition of services to an organization contributions to which are deductible may constitute a
deductible contribution.”66 The Davis Court emphasized that the deduction allowed by Section
1.170A-1(g) pertains to the individual taxpayer’s “unreimbursed expenditures” to their own
contribution of services to an organization and not to a third party.67 It feared that the parent
taxpayers’ interpretation of Section 1.170A-1(g) as allowing third parties a deduction would
promote a manipulation for tax evasion and impose a heavy administrative burden on the
IRS.68
II. CONTRIBUTION TO AN INDIVIDUAL
Charitable contributions given directly to or earmarked for a specific individual not possessed
by a charity are not deductible.69 Therefore, if a charity or qualified organization is not the
recipient of a contribution but rather an individual, the contribution is not deductible.70 For
example, if an individual collected donations through a GoFundMe page for an individual, the
issues that arise are whether the donor is entitled to a deduction and whether the recipient has
an income.71 In this situation, the donor would not be entitled to a deduction because the
contribution is not to a qualifying charitable organization but rather to a designated
individual.72 The test for gross income comes from the holding in C.I.R. v. Glenshaw Glass Co.73
Under the Glenshaw Glass74 test for gross income, the recipient would include the donations in
gross income.75 However, the contributions to the recipient would not be included in the
recipient’s gross income because the contributions are a gift, and gifts are specifically excluded
from gross income.76 What if James lost his belongings in a house fire and you gave his family
money to help with repairs and other costs? The transfer is a gift, so the recipient will not have
gross income,77 but the donor will not be entitled to a deduction.78 There are complexities
regarding what is treated as a gift and limitations on the exclusion from gross income, but that
discussion is beyond the scope of this Article.
This denial of deduction extends to situations where a charity is used as a conduit to funnel
benefits to the contributor. In DeJong v. Commissioner, a nonprofit corporation ran a school
that did not charge tuition but raised its funds from parents of enrolled students, churches,
members, and other people.79 The contributions to the nonprofit were placed in the
undesignated general operating fund.80 Here, the taxpayer’s children were students of the

school, and the taxpayer contributed to the nonprofit. The parents deducted their contribution
on their tax return.81 The court held that the amount contributed for the estimated cost of
educating the taxpayers’ children was intended as tuition payments for their children’s
education and did not constitute a charitable contribution.82
In Haak v. United States, the members would pay the Church, who would pay the local
Christian schools the amounts equal to the cost of educating the parent members’ children.83
The court agreed with the Service that the payments made to the Church in the amount of the
cost for their children’s tuition were not “contribution(s) or gift(s),” but rather payments for
education and did not constitute a charitable contribution.84 In both DeJong and Haak,
children were not refused admission for failure to pay by the parents or the church,
respectively.85 However, the payments were expected and did not constitute charitable
contributions.86

C. CHARITABLE CONDUIT: CONTRIBUTION TO A 501(C)(3) ORGANIZATION THROUGH AN
INDIVIDUAL
Revisiting the John Doe example, John collecting contributions through his Venmo account to
later transfer to The Boys & Girls Club of North Mississippi is the act of a conduit.87 Individuals
can collect charitable contributions from donors and then forward them to charities, acting as
a conduit.88 In this situation, contributors will receive deductions from their income for their
charitable contribution.89 The individual acting as the conduit will not have any income from
the solicitations held by the conduit solely for payment to the charity.
In Glenshaw Glass, the Court held that taxpayers have gross income when (1) they have
undeniable accession to wealth, (2) the wealth is clearly realized, and (3) the taxpayers have
complete dominion over the wealth.90[4] The conduit does not have an accession to wealth
because the conduit does not benefit from the funds; the wealth may be clearly realized, but
the conduit does not have dominion over the wealth because they are merely holding the
funds until the transfer to the charity.91
The conduit is merely holding the excess funds for the charity’s benefit and, therefore, does not
have any gross income. One avenue that the conduit could use to ensure that the funds
collected would not be included in gross income is to place the funds in a special trust, similar

to Ford Dealers Advertising Fund, Inc. v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue.92 The excess funds were
placed in a special trust that allowed the conduit to avoid being taxed on income.93 In Ford
Dealers, a nonprofit corporation that received earmarked funds to be used solely for
advertising purposes held the funds received “in trust,” with no gain in profit or gain accruing
to the taxpayer, and are excluded from gross income.94 The nonprofit corporation argued that
they “served merely as a conduit or agent for forwarding” the funds to the advertising media.95
However, a conduit does not need to go through the trouble of setting up a formal trust to
avoid including the funds in gross income as long as the conduit holds the excess funds
intending to transfer it to or for the benefit of a charity.96 Accordingly, if a conduit collects
funds through their Venmo account designated for a charity, and the funds are held for the
charity’s exclusive use, the funds are excluded from gross income.97
I. TIMING
In the conduit situation, when will the contributor get a deduction?98 In Jane’s case, if the
organization does not donate the funds collected during last year’s fundraising week to the
shelter until the start of the new year, will the contributors get a tax deduction in the year they
donated or the next?99 A deduction is allowed for a charitable contribution within the taxable
year the contribution is paid.100 Determining when the contributor is allowed the deduction
depends on when the conduit sends the contributions to the charity.101 What happens if
Taxpayer A gives money to Taxpayer B and Taxpayer B gives money to the charity in tax year 1?
Taxpayer A gets the deduction in year 1 because the contribution was paid to the charity in tax
year 1. Taxpayer B, acting as a conduit, has neither gross income nor a deduction.102
What happens if Taxpayer A gives money to Taxpayer B and Taxpayer B does not give the
charity money until tax year 2? Taxpayer A does not get the deduction in tax year 1 because the
contribution has not yet been made to the charity, and only when a contribution is “actually
paid during the taxable year” to a charitable organization will Taxpayer A be entitled to a
deduction.103 It is still in the hands of Taxpayer B. Taxpayer B still does not get a deduction
because they are simply forwarding the contributions to the charity.104 Correspondingly, the
contributors who donated to the children’s shelter through Jane’s organization would not get a
deduction until the funds were given to the shelter in the new year. Jane is Taxpayer B in this
situation and does not get a deduction because she is simply a conduit and not the intended

beneficiary.105 This is important because the taxpayer needs to know what tax year to file their
deduction.106
The conduit needs to get the funds into the hands of a charitable organization within the same
taxable year that the contributor gave the funds to the conduit. This capability will fix a
problem sequence that will occur in the conduit situation with an overfunded charity. First, if
the charity does not take the funds from the conduit at all, then the timing becomes an issue
because if the charity does not take it, the conduit would still have the funds at the close of the
taxable year. Now, the contributor does not get their deduction in the first taxable year.
However, the contributor may not know that they do not get their deduction in the first taxable
year because they had already turned over their funds to the conduit during the first taxable
year. Therefore, the contributor could incorrectly claim a deduction when they filed their tax
return for the first taxable year.107
II. MOBILE PAYMENT APPLICATIONS
Often, people will post requests for donations on their social media pages.108 These donations
are processed through their mobile payment accounts. The individual collects the funds to
transfer them to charitable organizations. In this situation, the individual acts as a conduit for
the charity. These donations would still be tax-deductible to the contributor who transfers
funds to the conduit for retransfer to the charity.
For example, an individual, who is not an employee or representative of a charity, posted a
status on their Facebook page requesting donations for a specific charity. The individual’s
Facebook friends send payments via their personal Venmo account to the individual’s personal
Venmo account. The purpose of the payments is named by the contributors on the subject line
required by Venmo. The individual will take the funds collected through Venmo and transfer
the funds to the specific charity, acting as a conduit.
The tax implications for those using mobile payment applications are the same for those
donating directly to a charity. If the charity needs the donations, the contributor will get a
deduction for the donation. The conduit who collects the funds will forward the donations and
will not have gross income because the conduit did not receive a gain or loss from the
transaction.

III. COMMUNICATION CERTAINTY: OVERFUNDED CHARITY
What happens if the charity is no longer in need of donations? If a charity receives more funds
than needed for a certain cause, then the charity is overfunded. If the charity receives more
donations than it needs for its charitable purposes, the charity must contact its donors and ask
permission to use them for a different purpose or return the funds to the donor.109 In Adler v.
SAVE, the donors made an earmarked contribution to a nonprofit animal shelter to construct
rooms exclusively for the care of larger dogs and older cats.110 The Court held that the animal
shelter breached its fiduciary duty by disregarding the donor’s expressed conditions and not
returning the gift.111
If a charity is overfunded or the charitable purpose is no longer available, there are three
options for the charity. First, the charity could simply decline to accept the donation because
they are overfunded. For example, if the local library received enough donations to meet their
need for a new roof, the library can decline to accept donations that would be more than the
need. Second, if they accepted in excess and realized later that they were overfunded, they
could contact the donor and return them. Finally, if a contribution is made for a certain
charitable purpose and originally or later on cannot be completed, it could be donated to a
similar alternate use according to the donor’s intentions.112 If several donations were made
and the library realized later on that the donations were more than the library’s need for a new
roof, then the library could use those donations to repair other exterior parts of the building, as
this would be a similar alternate use.
IV. COMMUNICATION UNCERTAINTY: OVERFUNDED CHARITY
In the conduit situation, complications arise when a charity declines to accept the conduit’s
collected amounts because they are overfunded. Similarly, in the preceding library example, a
conduit collected donations for the library’s roof, and then the library declined to accept them
because it had satisfied their need. In this situation, the conduit would be holding a pool of
funds specified for a particular charity where the charitable purpose no longer existed. The
conduit must either return the funds to the contributor or ask for permission for the funds to
be used in a different charitable way.113 With donations from the conduit’s Facebook friends,
this is not difficult because the conduit can contact them and ask for permission, either by
Facebook messenger or through their personal contact information.114

Now, assume that the funds the conduit collects through Venmo are not just from their
Facebook friends but also from unknown accounts.115 For example, if someone posted on their
social media soliciting contributions and their friends share the post, then people on their
friend list will have access to the post. Then, the friends of the friends can share the post so
people on their friend list will have access to it. This process could happen any number of
times; with the original post circulating the internet, countless people will see the post.116 This
means that countless people will have the information to go to the initial person’s Venmo
account and contribute, whether the contributor knows the person soliciting donations or not.
The problem arises with this system when the charity declines to accept the contributions
collected by the conduit. How does the conduit return the funds or ask for permission for the
funds to be used for a different cause when the funds were received by unknown people?117
The conduit could return the funds via Venmo by transferring back the donated money to the
contributor.118 This is not the most beneficial result because the contributor may not want
their funds returned. The contributor may be committed to a certain kind of charitable
function, or the contributors were really dedicated to that particular purpose and may want
those funds to go to a similar purpose. The obligation to return the funds without an
alternative opportunity could result in a lack of incentive for the contributors to donate those
funds to another charity, leading to less overall charitable giving.
V. PRIVACY DILEMMA
The strict privacy policies with mobile payments, however, prevent easy communication
between the contributor and conduit. An individual can go to a mobile payment site, such as
Venmo, and set up an account within seconds. The requirements for a Venmo account are your
first and last name, email address, phone number, password, Consent to Receive Electronic
Disclosures and Agree to User Agreement and Privacy Policy.119 Mobile payment users’
accounts can be linked to their bank account or credit or debit card with a small processing fee.
Transactions through mobile payment services have fraud, theft, and privacy risks.120 Venmo’s
policies respond to those privacy risks. According to Venmo’s privacy policy, the application
stores and processes information using third-party servers and safeguards that comply with
federal and state regulations.121 With mobile payments, regulations governing traditional
payments apply, but “there is still uncertainty about coverage and liability responsibilities.”122

There is no specific agency that controls and governs mobile payments, but there are
regulatory agencies that have “limited regulatory oversight.”123
Venmo’s interface and privacy settings are much more restrictive than an application such as
Facebook. A Venmo account’s contact information is not public information, so the conduit
would not have access to the contributor’s information.124 Additionally, there is no option to
direct message an account on Venmo.125 The Treasury regulations are unclear about how the
conduit would contact the contributor to request permission to use the funds for a different
purpose. With no guidance on this situation, the conduit would be forced to return the funds
without the option to request permission for a different charitable use.126
Assume the conduit found a similar charity in need of donations and gave the excess funds to
them instead, even though the funds the conduit collected through Venmo were specified for a
different charity. What happens if the contributor did not want their contribution to go to a
similar charity but wanted their funds to go to the specified charity? Depending on the actions
that the contributor plans to take, the conduit could find themselves in difficult circumstances.
If a contributor made a large donation to a specific charitable purpose and the conduit
donated the funds to a similar charity but not the specific one, the contributor could file suit
against the conduit or the unintended charity for a variety of claims, including breach of
fiduciary duty.127 The conduit has a fiduciary duty to the contributor because the contributor
relied on the conduit to act in their donation’s best interest.128 Similarly, the charity that
accepted the designated funds that they knew were not intended for them could be liable.

IV. SOLUTION
There is not a one size fits all solution for this problem. Any of the following potential solutions
would be successful if implemented to protect the conduit, but various factors will be
addressed that lead to the best option. While there are potential solutions to this problem, the
actors with the ability to solve the problems lack the incentive to do so; however, there are
options, such as an equitable alternate use clause, change in the regulations, announcement
by the charity, and a conduit self-protection provision, that could clear up uncertainty.

A. EQUITABLE ALTERNATE USE
The mobile payment application’s user agreement could include a waiver or substitution
clause with “equitable alternate use” language for charitable donations. This would allow the
collector of charitable contributions to use excess funds in an equitable alternative way
without gaining consent. The Venmo user agreement provides an update provision that states
if the changes to the agreement reduce rights or increase responsibilities, there will be a notice
of at least 21 days.129 Additionally, the user agreement states, “[b]y continuing to use our
services after any changes to this user agreement become effective, you agree to abide and be
bound by those changes.”130 For example, the mobile payment application could provide the
following language for the alternate use clause:



By donating through our services, you consent to the user’s
*insert conduit’s username*, to whom you donate the
charitable contributions, capability to use any excess funds
in an equitable alternate use. Therefore, charitable
donations through our services waive designated donations
when the original purpose no longer exists.

This clause would act as a waiver and allow the conduit to control the funds without having to
gain consent if the charity did not accept the donations. Venmo’s incentive to make an
equitable alternate use provision would encourage their users to contribute to charities.
However, Venmo’s desire for their users to make charitable contributions is probably not
strong enough for them to draft a special provision. Mobile payment applications doubtfully
have an incentive to protect the conduit but rather themselves.

B. CHANGE IN THE REGULATIONS
The current regulations are not clear, nor do they distinguish rules for an individual acting as a
conduit between the contributor and the charity. There could be an addition to the IRS

regulations to allow for charities to accept and hold the contributions if they are overfunded
until they find a similar use. Additionally, the regulations could provide that if the charity
declined to accept donations because the charity was overfunded, the conduit could transfer
to a similar use. Specifically, the provision could state the conduit has the control to transfer to
a similar use for conduits when contributions are made using mobile payment applications,
such as Venmo. In the special rule, it could allow for an equal or similar use. For example, the
regulation could include the following language:



Unless otherwise provided by applicable regulations or
other guidance published in the Internal Revenue Code,
contributions to a charitable organization using a third party
through a mobile payment application, rather than directly
to the organization, are subject to an alternate but similar
use if the original purpose is unavailable. Further,
overfunded charitable organizations may accept excess
earmarked donations and use the funds for a similar use.

The IRS has an incentive to put in a special rule because they want people to be able to
contribute to charities. However, it could be difficult to get the IRS to recognize the problem
and timely change the regulations.

C. CHARITY ANNOUNCEMENT
An alternative solution would be if the charity made a general announcement on their
webpage stating the alternatives to earmarked donations if the charitable purpose no longer
exists. For example, the announcement could include the language as follows:



All earmarked donations will go to the *insert specified
purpose* to the extent possible, and then to a similar
alternate purpose to the extent possible. Lastly, the
donations will then go to general charitable funds if the
other alternatives are unavailable.

The only exception is that the contributor provided specific language stating otherwise at the
time of donation, such as the specific request for return of funds if the earmarked purpose no
longer exists. However, for donations through a conduit on mobile payments applications, the
announcement on a charity’s website might not be available to the contributor. The charity’s
incentive to make an announcement would be to raise money. However, the issue is that the
contributor will not go to the charity’s page; it is the conduit who goes to the charity’s web
page. Therefore, the charity announcement may not shield liability for the conduit because the
contributor is not donating directly to the charity.

D. CONDUIT SELF-PROTECTION PROVISION
In an ideal world, one of the foregoing solutions would be implemented. However, a conduit
protection provision is possibly the most logical and sensible action for the conduit situation.
How do we fix this problem of the lack of information between the contributor and the
conduit? Initially, how did the contributor know to give it to the conduit? The conduit, in some
way, reached out to solicit the contributor. In the John example, he posted on Facebook
requesting donations for The Boys & Girls Club of North Mississippi’s new gymnasium.131
Following his post, his friends shared the post, and then their friends shared the post. At this
point, hundreds of people could have seen the request for donations all stemming from John’s
initial solicitation. Therefore, the conduit can control the information that the contributor sees
prior to donation. For instance, the conduits could provide the following language on their
social media post soliciting contributions:



If you forward money to me for *insert specific charity or
charitable use* and that charity is overfunded or does not
accept the contributions, I will give the funds to an alternate
but similar use.

This provision will put the contributor on notice that their funds will be used for an alternate
similar use if the charity is overfunded. At this point, the contributors, at their discretion, may
decide whether they are going to donate to the conduit. The provision will provide the
conduits with the ability to use the pool of funds and assist worthy causes and protect
themselves from liability.

V. CONCLUSION
According to I.R.C. Section 170, “[t]here shall be allowed as a deduction any charitable
contribution . . . payment of which is made within the taxable year.”132 If a donor donated to a
designated individual, the donor would not be entitled to a deduction because it was not for a
public benefit and, therefore, not a charitable contribution.133 If an individual donated directly
to a charitable organization, they would be entitled to a deduction when they made the
donation.134 Correspondingly, in the conduit situation, the contributor’s donation would be
deductible within the taxable year that the conduit transferred the funds to the charity.135
If an individual solicited and collected funds for a charitable organization, the individual would
be acting as a conduit between the donor and the charity. If the charitable organization
becomes overfunded and the charitable purpose no longer exists, then the conduit must return
the funds to the donors or ask permission for the contributions to be given to a different
charitable organization. However, the latter option has been increasingly difficult when the
conduit is collecting funds using a mobile payment application, such as Venmo, and does not
have the donors’ contact information.

If a donor donates directly to a charity and the charity is overfunded, or the charitable purpose
is no longer available, the charity must return the funds or ask permission for the funds to be
used for a different purpose.136 Because the donor directly donated, the charity would reach
out and ask permission for the funds to be used differently. In the conduit situation, it would be
difficult to ask permission to donate the funds to a different charity through a mobile payment
application because the applications do not offer contact information or an option to contact
between users. For example, if John Doe solicited funds for the gymnasium for The Boys & Girls
Club of North Mississippi, John Doe is the conduit of the contributor’s funds to The Boys & Girls
Club of North Mississippi.137 If The Boys & Girls Club had collected sufficient funds for the
gymnasium before the conduit had transferred the funds to them, the conduit needs to give
the funds to an alternate, similar charitable organization within the same taxable year that the
contributor gave the funds to the conduit.
Similarly, if Jane collected the money from last year’s fundraising week, but the organization
did not present the donations to the children’s shelter until the start of the next calendar year,
then the contributors during the fundraising week will not receive a deduction until the
donation is transferred to the shelter.138 Further, Jane would not have to report the $30,000
sitting in her Venmo account because she is a conduit and will not receive a financial benefit
from the funds because the money will be transferred to the shelter. Jane did not have an
accession to wealth, clearly realize, or exercise complete dominion over the money to be gross
income.139
Correspondingly, there are solutions to the overfunded charity situation that will protect the
conduit from liability.140 The potential solutions include a waiver in the mobile payment
application’s user agreement, a change in the regulations, an announcement by the charity,
and a conduit self-protection provision. However, the actors in most of the proposed solutions
lack the incentive to solve the issue.141 For the equitable alternate use provision, the mobile
payment application’s motivation to protect users and encourage contributions to charity is
likely not strong enough to include a special provision for charitable donations. Second, the
IRS has an incentive to change the regulations so that people will raise money for charities;
however, the IRS may not recognize the issues and propose a timely change. Next, the charity
making an announcement on their website is motivated by the desire to raise money, but the
problem here is that the contributor may not visit the website and see the announcement

because they donate through a conduit. Finally, the conduit self-protection provision is likely
the most advantageous solution to the conduit situation with an overfunded charity.
In conclusion, the self-protection provision is the answer to the complications created by the
interaction between the Tax Code requirements and the difficulty in returning the funds
received in the conduit situation.
With the future of mobile payments, the use of online payment services will only continue to
rise. Simplicity, convenience, and security are attractive qualities to an increasingly mobile
world. As society gets more comfortable transferring large amounts of funds via mobile
payment applications, legality issues are likely to arise due to the variety of situations
previously described without clear authority or regulations. Being ahead and proactive on this
matter will prove beneficial in the years to come.
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(last visited Dec. 18, 2020) (“18% of donors worldwide have given through Facebook
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18, 2020) (“Venmo should only be used to transact with people you know and trust. Do
not use Venmo to transact with people you don’t know.”). 
116. With over 2.7 billion monthly users as of September 30, 2020, and almost 75% of users
visit daily, Facebook posts can be seen by a considerable amount of people proportionate
to the number of shares the post receives and the number of friends the person who
shared the post has. See Facebook Reports Third Quarter 2020 Results, Facebook,
https://s21.q4cdn.com/399680738/files/doc_news/Facebook-Reports-Third-Quarter2020-Results-2020.pdf (last visited Dec. 17, 2020). 
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